SAP Mobile Platform DataVault Keystream Recovery

The SAP Mobile Platform 3.0 SP5 has an API called DataVault, which is used to securely store data on mobile devices. Due to an incorrect implementation of the cryptographic algorithms and parameters, it is possible to recover the keystream for the encrypted data. As a result, it is possible to recover part of the plaintext corresponding to an encrypted piece of data thus reverting the encryption process of some values inside the DataVault without needing the original secret key. Furthermore, due to the lack of cryptographic integrity mechanisms in the SAP DataVault an attacker recovering this keystream has the possibility of re-encrypting (or modifying in practical terms) with some limitations, some values previously encrypted inside the DataVault.

Facebook Awards $100,000 for New Class of Vulnerabilities and Detection Tool

Facebook doubles the payout of its Internet Defense Prize with a $100,000 award to a team of Georgia Tech researchers for a new class of browser-based memory-corruption vulnerabilities and a corresponding detection technique.

Microsoft Internet Explorer CTreeNode::GetCascadedLang Use-After-Free

Microsoft Internet Explorer 11 is prone to a use-after-free vulnerability in the MSHTML!CTreeNode::GetCascadedLang function. The following analysis was performed on Internet Explorer 11 on Windows 8.1 (x64). If an attacker succeeds in bypassing the Memory Protector and Isolated Heap protection mechanisms this vulnerability allows the execution of arbitrary code on vulnerable installations of Microsoft Internet Explorer. User interaction is required to exploit this vulnerability in that the target must visit a malicious page or open a malicious file.

Java Secure Socket Extension (JSSE) SKIP-TLS MITM Proxy

This Metasploit module exploits an incomplete internal state distinction in Java Secure Socket Extension (JSSE) by impersonating the server and finishing the handshake before the peers have authenticated themselves and instantiated negotiated security parameters, resulting in a plaintext SSL/TLS session with the client. This plaintext SSL/TLS session is then proxied to the server using a second SSL/TLS session from the proxy to the server (or an alternate fake server) allowing the session to continue normally and plaintext application data transmitted between the peers to be saved. This Metasploit module requires an active man-in-the-middle attack.