Openfire version 3.10.2 suffers from a cross site request forgery vulnerability.

IKEView.exe is vulnerable to local stack based buffer overflow when parsing an malicious (internet key exchange) “.elg” file. Vulnerability causes nSEH & SEH pointer overwrites at 4432 bytes after IKEView parses our malicious file, which may result then result in arbitrary attacker supplied code execution.

The Windows Kernel is subject to two related kernel-mode type-confusion vulnerabilities inside win32k!xxxRemoteReconnect. In both cases, a user-mode parameter passed to the syscall is incorrectly resolved to its underlying kernel representation via ObReferenceObjectByHandle passing NULL as the “ObType” field (rather than *IoFileTypeObject and *IoDeviceTypeObject respectively). Because the type is not checked, if a handle of a type other than a HANDLE to a file and a device are passed, the kernel incorrectly uses the underlying representation of the object as a PFILE_OBJECT and a PDEVICE_OBJECT, causing memory corruption in the kernel.

The Install.framework runner suid root binary does not correctly account for the fact that Distributed Objects can be connected to by multiple clients at the same time. By connecting two proxy objects to an IFInstallRunner and calling [IFInstallRunner makeReceiptDirAt:asRoot:] in the first and passing a custom object as the directory name we can get a callback to our code just after the makeReceiptDirAt code has called seteuid(0);setguid(0) to regain privs. Since BSD priviledges are per-process this means that our other proxy object will now have euid 0 without having to provide an authorization reference. In this second proxy we can then just call runTaskSecurely and get a root shell before returning from the first proxy’s callback function which will then drop privs.