libs/zbxmedia/eztexting.c in Zabbix 1.8.x before 1.8.18rc1, 2.0.x before 2.0.8rc1, and 2.1.x before 2.1.2 does not properly set the CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYHOST option for libcurl, which allows man-in-the-middle attackers to spoof SSL servers via an arbitrary valid certificate.
The parser cache functionality in parsergenerator.py in RPLY (aka python-rply) before 0.7.1 allows local users to spoof cache data by pre-creating a temporary rply-*.json file with a predictable name. (CVSS:2.1) (Last Update:2014-01-28)
Race condition in the xdg.BaseDirectory.get_runtime_dir function in python-xdg 0.25 allows local users to overwrite arbitrary files by pre-creating /tmp/pyxdg-runtime-dir-fallback-victim to point to a victim-owned location, then replacing it with a symlink to an attacker-controlled location once the get_runtime_dir function is called. (CVSS:3.3) (Last Update:2014-02-24)
Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in JV Comment (com_jvcomment) 3.0.2 for Joomla! allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via the id parameter in a comment.like action. (CVSS:4.3) (Last Update:2014-02-24)
Double free vulnerability in Apple Pages 2.x before 2.1 and 5.x before 5.1 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted Microsoft Word file.
The RPC protocol implementation in Apache Hadoop 2.x before 2.0.6-alpha, 0.23.x before 0.23.9, and 1.x before 1.2.1, when the Kerberos security features are enabled, allows man-in-the-middle attackers to disable bidirectional authentication and obtain sensitive information by forcing a downgrade to simple authentication. (CVSS:3.2) (Last Update:2014-04-24)
Unspecified vulnerability in NVIDIA graphics driver Release 331, 325, 319, 310, and 304 allows local users to bypass intended access restrictions for the GPU and gain privileges via unknown vectors.
Original release date: January 17, 2014 | Last revised: March 07, 2014
Certain UDP protocols have been identified as potential attack vectors:
- Quake Network Protocol
- Steam Protocol
A Distributed Reflective Denial of Service (DRDoS) attack is an emerging form of Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) that relies on the use of publicly accessible UDP servers, as well as bandwidth amplification factors, to overwhelm a victim system with UDP traffic.
UDP, by design, is a connection-less protocol that does not validate source IP addresses. Â Unless theÂ application-layer protocol uses countermeasures such as sessionÂ initiation,Â it is very easy to forge the IP packet datagram to include an arbitrary source IP address . Â When many UDP packets have their source IP address forged to a single address, the server responds to that victim, creating a reflected Denial of Service (DoS) Attack.
Recently, certain UDP protocols have been found to have particular responses to certain commands that are much larger than the initial request. Â Where before, attackers were limited linearly by the number of packets directly sent to the target to conduct a DoS attack, now a single packet can generate tens or hundreds of times the bandwidth in its response. Â This is called an amplification attack, and when combined with a reflective DoS attack on a large scale it makes it relatively easy to conduct DDoS attacks. Â
To measure the potential effect of an amplification attack, we use a metric called the bandwidth amplification factor (BAF). Â BAF can be calculated as the number of UDP payload bytes that an amplifier sends to answer a request, compared to the number of UDP payload bytes of the request  .
The list of known protocols, and their associated bandwidth amplification factors, is listed below. Â US-CERT would like to offer thanks to Christian Rossow for providing this information to us. Â For more information on bandwith amplificatication factors, please see Christian’s blog and associated research paper.
|Bandwidth Amplification Factor
|28 to 54
|see: TA13-088AÂ 
|see: TA14-013AÂ 
|Character generation request
|Peer list exchange
|Quake Network Protocol
|Server info exchange
|Server info exchange
Attackers can utilize the bandwidth and relative trust of large servers that provide the above UDP protocols to flood victims with unwanted traffic, a DDoS attack.
Detection of DRDoS attacks is not easy, due to their use of large, trusted servers that provide UDP services. Â As a victim, traditional DoS mitigation techniques may apply.
As a network operator of one of these exploitable services, look for abnormally large responses to a particular IP address. Â This may indicate that an attacker is using your service to conduct a DRDoS attack.
Source IP Verification
Because the UDP requests being sent by the attacker-controlled clients must have a source IP address spoofed to appear as the victimâs IP, the first step to reducing the effectiveness of UDP amplification is for Internet Service Providers to reject any UDP traffic with spoofed addresses. The Network Working Group of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) released Best Current Practice 38 document in May 2000 and Best Current Practice 84 in March 2004 that describes how an Internet Service Provider can filter network traffic on their network to reject packets with source addresses not reachable via the actual packetâs path . Â The changes recommended in these documents would cause a routing device to evaluate whether it is possible to reach the source IP address of the packet via the interface that transmitted the packet. If it is not possible, then the packet most likely has a spoofed source IP address. This configuration change would substantially reduce the potential for most popular types of DDoS attacks. As such, we highly recommend to all network operators to perform network ingress filtering if possible. Â Note that it will not explicitly protect a UDP service provider from being exploited in a DRDoS (all network providers must use ingress filtering in order to completely eliminate the threat).
To verify your network has implemented ingress filtering, download the open source tools from the Spoofer ProjectÂ .
Limiting responses to UDP requests is another potential mitigation to this issue. Â This may require testing to discover the optimal limit that does not interfere with legitimate traffic. Â The IETF released Request for Comment 2475 and Request for Comment 3260 that describes some methods to shape and control traffic  . Â Most network devices today provide these functions in their software.Â
-  DNS Amplification Attacks
-  NTP Amplification Attacks Using CVE-2013-5211
-  Network Ingress Filtering: Defeating Denial of Service Attacks which employ IP Source Address Spoofing
-  Ingress Filtering for Multihomed Networks
-  The Spoofer Project
-  An Architecture for Differentiated Services
-  SIP: Session Initiation Protocol
-  New Terminology and Clarifications for Diffserv
-  Amplification Hell: Abusing Network Protocols for DDoS
-  Ampliï¬cation Hell: Revisiting Network Protocols for DDoS Abuse
- February 09, 2014 – Initial Release
- March 07, 2014 – Updated page to include research links