From There to Here (But Not Back Again)

Red Hat Product Security recently celebrated our 15th anniversary this summer and while I cannot claim to have been with Red Hat for that long (although I’m coming up on 8 years myself), I’ve watched the changes from the “0day” of the Red Hat Security Response Team to today. In fact, our SRT was the basis for the security team that Mandrakesoft started back in the day.

In 1999, I started working for Mandrakesoft, primarily as a packager/maintainer. The offer came, I suspect, because of the amount of time I spent volunteering to maintain packages in the distribution. I also was writing articles for TechRepublic at the time, so I also ended up being responsible for some areas of documentation, contributing to the manual we shipped with every boxed set we sold (remember when you bought these things off the shelf?).

Way back then, when security flaws were few and far between (well, the discovery of these flaws, not the existence of them, as we’ve found much to our chagrin over the years), there was one individual at Mandrakesoft who would apply fixes and release them. The advisory process was ad-hoc at best, and as we started to get more volume it was taking his time away from kernel hacking and so they turned to me to help. Having no idea that this was a pivotal turning point and would set the tone and direction of the next 16 years of my life, I accepted. The first security advisory I released for Linux-Mandrake was an update to BitchX in July of 2000. So in effect, while Red Hat Product Security celebrated 15 years of existence this summer, I celebrated my 16th anniversary of “product security” in open source.

When I look back over those 16 years, things have changed tremendously. When I started the security “team” at Mandrakesoft (which, for the majority of the 8 years I spent there, was a one-man operation!) I really had no idea what the future would hold. It blows my mind how far we as an industry have come and how far I as an individual have come as well. Today it amazes me how I handled all of the security updates for all of our supported products (multiple versions of Mandriva Linux, the Single Network Firewall, Multi-Network Firewall, the Corporate Server, and so on). While there was infrastructure to build the distributions, there was none for building or testing security updates. As a result, I had a multi-machine setup (pre-VM days!) with a number of chroots for building and others for testing. I had to do all of the discovery, the patching, backporting, building, testing, and the release. In fact, I wrote the tooling to push advisories, send mail announcements, build packages across multiple chroots, and more. The entire security update “stack” was written by me and ran in my basement.

During this whole time I looked to Red Hat for leadership and guidance. As you might imagine, we had to play a little bit of catchup many times and when it came to patches and information, it was Red Hat that we looked at primarily (I’m not at all ashamed to state that quite often we would pull patches from a Red Hat update to tweak and apply to our own packages!). In fact, I remember the first time I talked with Mark Cox back in 2004 when we, along with representatives of SUSE and Debian, responded to the claims that Linux was less secure than Windows. While we had often worked well together through cross-vendor lists like vendor-sec and coordinated on embargoed issues and so on, this was the first real public stand by open source security teams against some mud that was being hurled against not just our products, but open source security as a whole. This was one of those defining moments that made me scary-proud to be involved in the open source ecosystem. We set aside competition to stand united against something that deeply impacted us all.

In 2009 I left Mandriva to work for Red Hat as part of the Security Response Team (what we were called back then). Moving from a struggling small company to a much larger company was a very interesting change for me. Probably the biggest change and surprise was that Red Hat had the developers do the actual patching and building of packages they normally maintained and were experienced with. We had a dedicated QA team to test this stuff! We had a rigorous errata process that automated as much as possible and enforced certain expectations and conditions of both errata and associated packages. I was actually able to focus on the security side of things and not the “release chain” and all parts associated with it, plus there was a team of people to work with when investigating security issues.

Back at Mandriva, the only standard we focused on was the usage of CVE. Coming to Red Hat introduced me to the many standards that we not only used and promoted, but also helped shape. You can see this in CVE, and now DWF, OpenSCAP and OVAL, CVRF, the list goes on. Not only are we working to make, and keep, our products secure for our customers, but we apply our expertise to projects and standards that benefit others as these standards help to shape other product security or incident response teams, whether they work on open source or not.

Finally (as an aside and a “fun fact”) when I first started working at Mandrakesoft with open source and Linux, I got a tattoo of Tux on my calf. A decade later, I got a tattoo of Shadowman on the other calf. I’m really lucky to work on things with cool logos, however I’ve so far resisted getting a tattoo of the heartbleed logo!

I sit and think about that initial question that I was asked 16 years ago: “Would you want to handle the security updates?”. I had no idea it would send me to work with the people, places, and companies that I have. No question that there were challenges and more than a few times I’m sure that the internet was literally on fire but it has been rewarding and satisfying. And I consider myself fortunate that I get to work every day with some of the smartest, most creative, and passionate people in open source!

The Internet collapses, brings the world to a halt for a few hours

 

young man with glasses sitting in front of his computer, programming. the code he is working on (CSS) can be seen through the screen.

A massive cyber-attack against US DNS service provider Dyn knocked out major websites across the Internet last Friday. The attack shut down several websites, including Netflix, Twitter, Amazon and The New York Times. The Internet service was disrupted for almost 11 hours, affecting more than one billion customers around the world.

Cyber crooks are always looking for ways to exploit the latest, most innovative technologies to carry out attacks like those we saw just a few hours ago. Are we in the Age of Internet Attacks? The latest PandaLabs Quarterly Report already warned of the huge number of large-scale distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks that have been occurring over the last few months, and the way many of them are exploiting botnets made up of not only computers but also smart devices like IP cameras.

The recent DDoS attacks reflect the new approach taken by Black Hat hackers when it comes to launching new, more devastating campaigns that combine everyday devices and malware to form highly dangerous armies ready to launch DDoS attacks.

Probing Internet defenses

Just one month ago, security guru Bruce Schneier, published an article with the most revealing title: ‘Someone Is Learning How to Take Down the Internet.’

The recent examples of denial-of-service attacks flood servers with useless traffic that overburdens Internet bandwidth and prevents legitimate users from accessing targeted sites. Attacked servers become saturated with the huge number of requests.

The article explained that the best way to take down the Internet is through a DDoS attack like the one suffered by Dyn, and how some of the major companies that provide the basic infrastructure that makes the Internet work have seen an increase in DDoS attacks, in what seems to be an strategy to gather information and see how well these companies can defend themselves.

A few weeks ago, the website of Brian Krebs, a US journalist specialized in computer security issues, was taken offline as he fell victim to the largest DDoS attack to date. He was only able to go back online after Google came to the rescue.

This attack adds to the list of those suffered by a number of tech giants over the last few months, such as the hack of 500 million Yahoo accounts back in September, or the theft of 60 million  Dropbox user IDs and 100 million LinkedIn passwords.

It is precisely the success of the Internet, with billions of connected devices worldwide, that makes it so appealing to criminals willing to exploit its vulnerabilities. Many of these devices lack basic security measures, making them easy prey for hackers and, in this context, any organization, media company or social networking service can become the victim of the next attack.

 

The post The Internet collapses, brings the world to a halt for a few hours appeared first on Panda Security Mediacenter.

DDoS attack on Dyn took down the bulk of the Internet on Friday

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Many of us noticed that some of our favorite websites were acting a little strangely on Friday. Perhaps your tweets were failing to load or your connection to Spotify was wonky. Instead of brushing this off as the result of any regular online bug or unreliable Wi-Fi, take a moment to realize that these sites’ behavior was caused by a massive online attack that wiped out a significant portion of the Internet for hours on end.

Russian Hacker Behind LinkedIn Breach also Charged with Hacking Dropbox and Formspring

The alleged Russian hacker, who was arrested by the FBI in collaboration with the Czech police, was believed to be the one responsible for massive 2012 data breach at LinkedIn, according to a statement released by LinkedIn.

Now, United States authorities have officially indicted Yevgeniy Aleksandrovich Nikulin, 29-years-old Russian national, for hacking not just LinkedIn, but also the online

New Drammer Android Hack lets Apps take Full control (root) of your Phone

Earlier last year, security researchers from Google’s Project Zero outlined a way to hijack the computers running Linux by abusing a design flaw in the memory and gaining higher kernel privileges on the system.

Now, the same previously found designing weakness has been exploited to gain unfettered “root” access to millions of Android smartphones, allowing potentially anyone to take control of

jasper-1.900.13-1.fc24

New version of jasper is available (jasper-1.900.13).
Security fix for CVE-2016-8690, CVE-2016-8691, CVE-2016-8692, CVE-2016-8693.

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New version of jasper is available (1.900.3)

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Security fix for CVE-2016-2089

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New version of jasper is available.

jasper-1.900.13-1.fc23

New version of jasper is available (jasper-1.900.13).
Security fix for CVE-2016-8690, CVE-2016-8691, CVE-2016-8692, CVE-2016-8693.

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New version of jasper is available (1.900.3)

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Security fix for CVE-2016-2089

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New version of jasper is available.

tomcat-7.0.72-1.el6

This updates includes a rebase from tomcat 7.0.70 up to 7.0.72 which resolves one CVE:

* rhbz#1375582 CVE-2016-5388 Tomcat: CGI sets environmental variable based on user supplied Proxy request header

and includes one additional CVE fix along with two bug fixes:

* rhbz#1376718 CVE-2016-1240 tomcat: Local privilege escalation via unsafe file handling in the Tomcat init script
* rhbz#1379170 jsvc script is broken
* rhbz#1170797 remove tomcat6 dependency on redhat-lsb (and any other unnecessary ones)

tomcat-8.0.38-1.fc23

This updates includes a rebase from tomcat 8.0.36 up to 8.0.38 which resolves one CVE and a problem that 8.0.37 introduces to freeipa:

* rhbz#1375581 – CVE-2016-5388 Tomcat: CGI sets environmental variable based on user supplied Proxy request header

and includes two additional CVE fixes along with one bug fix:

* rhbz#1383210 CVE-2016-5425 tomcat: Local privilege escalation via systemd-tmpfiles service
* rhbz#1383216 – CVE-2016-6325 tomcat: tomcat writable config files allow privilege escalation
* rhbz#1370262 – catalina.out is no longer in use in the main package, but still gets rotated