To secure browser which is very fragile, the approach of HTTPS Only 3.1 is exceptionally simple:
1. Only HTTPS URLs(no other protocols)
2. Whitelist of domains(anything outside of whitelist is blocked)
Now, let’s look at threats:
1. Man in the middle – it’s fixed.
2. Phishing always requires the browser to load attacker’s website, so it’s permanently dead here.
3. Drive-by Download – dead(if applied strictly, unable to…
Advisory Information
=================
Title: Facebook Messenger (iOS) Certificate Validation Vulnerability
Advisory ID: SWRX-2016-001
Advisory URL: https://www.secureworks.com/research/swrx-2016-001
Date published: Tuesday, March 22, 2016
CVE: Not assigned
CVSS v2 base score: 5.8
Date of last update: Tuesday, March 22, 2016
Vendors contacted:…
0day exploit affecting CCTV DVR of over 70 different vendors. Attached is a
link to the research containing the vulnerability description and a working
exploit. In addition, It discuss the problem in performing responsible
disclosure with white label products.
the executable installers cispro_30day_installer_1150_8d.exe,
cispremium_installer_6100_08.exe, cav_installer_5951_60.exe,
cav_installer.exe and cfw_installer.exe available from
<http://www.comodo.com> load and execute several DLLs from
their “application directory”.
For software downloaded with a web browser the application
directory is typically the user’s “Downloads” directory: see
<…
Advisory: Cross-site Scripting in Securimage 3.6.2
RedTeam Pentesting discovered a cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability
in the Securimage CAPTCHA software, which allows attackers to inject
arbitrary JavaScript code via a crafted URL.
A novel persistent injection to Windows machines:
– By abusing “Dos Devices” registry key, a user could redefine the “C:”
symlink to an arbitrary value.
– smss.exe, which is responsible for mapping Dos devices, later maps “known
DLLs” as sections. These DLLs are typically loaded from
“C:WindowsSystem32” (e.g. kernel32.dll) and will henceforth be loaded to
any usermode process by the Windows loader.
– This…
Disclosure timeline
===================
February 10th, 2016: discovered 3 issues: memory corruption, authorization
bypass, CSRF.
February 10th, 2016; supplying technical details to Netgear, including POC
code.
February 12th, 2016: Netgear’s response – they said that only the Bezeq
firmware is vulneable.
February 13th, 2016: discovering command injection vulnerability, updating
Netgear.
February 14th, 2016: contacted Bezeq.
February 21st,…
Brief
====
AsusTEK asio.sys driver accepts IOCTLs that allow the user to freely
manipulate MSRs.
Disclosure timeline
================
March 4th, 2016: contacted AsusTEK via mail and online chat. AsusTEK blamed
it on Microsoft!
March 5th, 2016: contacted the Microsoft security response center.
March 10th, 2016: Microsoft acknowledged and asked AsusTEK to fix.
March 16th, 2016: AsusTEK refuse to admit their mistakes.
March 17th, 2016: public…